If the preceding chapter’s claim that Paul wrote of God’s restorative justice in delivering his people from slavery and not his retributive justice in punishing Jesus for the sins of the world, then those taught by Paul and the other apostles should be expected to teach this as well. Additionally, since this is not the understanding of most in the Western church in modern times, the time and cause of the divergence of view should be discoverable by reviewing the literature between then and now. This chapter makes the claim that this is indeed the case. The first part of the chapter reviews several passages from the Greek fathers and interacts with modern claims that they taught retributive justice, concluding that they did not, but rather taught the restorative justice that scripture teaches. The second part of the chapter examines passages from Tertullian and Augustine, some of the earliest and most important Latin fathers, and it shows how they did teach retributive justice to a far greater extent than the Greek fathers did. It concludes that translation to Latin and the unfamiliarity of most Latin fathers with Hebrew language and Semitic culture is the cause of the change in doctrine.

Obviously, a comprehensive review of the writings of the church fathers is well beyond the scope of this work. Once again, a survey will have to suffice, and this survey focuses on passages quoted by Thomas Torrance and Brian Arnold as representative of the best on the topic, though a few other examples are presented toward the end. Torrance takes the approach that he understands Paul better than those only one or two generations removed from him, while Arnold anachronistically reads modern definitions into the fathers, as discussed in the introduction. These passages from the fathers actually show reasoning and usage consistent with the entire scripture.

Greek Fathers

Didache

The Didache is one of the earliest Christian documents outside of the New Testament. Its absence of a three-level order of church office is evidence of a very early date even if it is a redaction of earlier tradition, and the underlying tradition is almost undoubtedly first century. A date of 110 for its currently known form is reasonable.^[1] Unlike much of the New Testament, it does not make much of a theological argument, but rather serves as a teaching tool to standardize basic Christian practice, likely for the benefit of catechumens. It begins by describing two ways, that of life and that of death, and describes these ways in terms clearly consistent with the teaching of Jesus and the apostles. The way of life beings with loving God and neighbor (1:1), and the way of death is associated with a vice list that notably includes not pitying the poor and turning away from the needy (5:2). It follows these moral instructions with practical instructions for the church on topics such as gathering for worship, receiving travelling teachers, giving, fasting, and prayer. It concludes in chapter 16 with a warning to watch lest the believers’ lamp be quenched by those who would corrupt their souls and the Lord judge when he comes.

Torrance criticizes the Didache, arguing that it diverges from apostolic teaching found in the New Testament (which, notably, had not been assembled as a canon when the document was written in the late first/early second century.  In fact, the New Testament was still being inspired by the Holy Spirit when the source traditions for the Didache were established). He claims that it is legalistic and misunderstands the New Testament attitude toward the Old, further claiming that the church at this stage had a very rudimentary understanding of apostolic doctrine and that this shows in the moralism of the Didache as it takes Jesus’ words out of context. It fails to grasp the “evangelical message of the Cross.” He summarizes its teaching thus: “By becoming a Christian a man only sets foot on the right way which he must follow through to the end in order to be saved. Salvation therefore is thrown forward to the future and tends to be regarded in terms of reward to righteous living.”^[2]Amazingly, Torrance has come to the conclusion that those who were directly taught by the apostles corrupt their doctrine while later theologians are more enlightened.

As should be clear from the summary above, Didache teaches how to live a life in love and God’s justice.  Wilhite sees soteriological metaphors and language subtly embedded in these instructions. He cites the ransom metaphor, bearing the Lord’s yoke, holiness in receiving the Eucharist, eternal life coming from the Father through the Son, and the Spirit preparing those who are called to Christ.^[3] These ideas are clearly drawn directly from the teachings of Jesus and the apostles and are consistent with the way their teaching has been depicted in this work. That they are not any more explicit is consistent with how O’Loughlin describes the purpose of the document, that of teaching rather than proclamation. Didache is teaching on how to live out the implications of the Gospel doctrine already received.^[4] The hints of the content of that Gospel, the oral gospel understood by the early church before the canon was complete, indicate consistency with the ideas of justice as deliverance and contain no hint of punishment or freedom from it.

 1 Clement

Authorship of 1 Clement is disputed, as Arnold notes, but the most likely author is the third bishop of Rome mentioned by Irenaeus as having seen the apostles and conversed with them and who may have been mentioned by Paul in Philippians 4:3. It was probably written in the 90’s CE.^[5] Like Didache, this leaves little time for corruption and seems to provide a witness of apostolic teaching. It is an occasional letter that addresses some of the same problems Paul wrote to address in Corinth.

Arnold begins his discussion of Clement with 32:3-4, a clear statement that past saints and Christians are glorified, magnified, and justified not through their own actions but through faith. He cites Torrance, noting agreement that Clement uses Pauline language but denying that the same thing is meant by justification.^[6] In fact, Torrance disputes the meaning of both faith and justification, defining the former as “fear of God working itself out in obedience” and not really explaining what he thinks is meant by the latter.^[7] In reality, Clement uses the terms similarly to Paul, though outside of a legal argument, citing movement from ignominy to glory by God’s action based on human faith according to his will in  discussion of justification, and consistent with Paul’s “obedience of faith” in Romans 1 and 16.  Torrance is correct, though, that it has nothing to do with pardon.

Based on this premise of different word usage, Torrance moves to chapter 30 and the statement that the reader should be justified by works and not by words. He claims that Clement’s entire basis for justification by faith is following God’s will and working out salvation.^[8] Arnold argues that Clement is entirely consistent with Paul, that the justified believer’s response is to be good works.^[9] This is certainly the case, though Arnold fails to address that like James, Clement insists that a person is to be justified by these works. Only by understanding that more than one definition of justification is in play can these statements only two chapters apart be resolved. A person is saved from slavery to sin, justified by faith and not by works of the Law (Romans 3:23-24), and then that same person is judged to be righteous in the final judgment, justified, according to the works done out of that same faith in contrast to works that involve returning to slavery to sin (Romans 2:6-10, 6:15-23, James 2:18-26). In this, Clement is entirely consistent with Paul, James, and the rest of the New Testament. The perceived conflict is caused by the use of modern definitions and interpretations, not by the first century authors.

Ignatius of Antioch

Ignatius was almost unarguably Bishop of Antioch, succeeding Peter according to Eusebius.^[10] He was said to have been a disciple of John the Apostle along with Polycarp and to have died between 98-117 CE during the reign of Trajan. His early date and closeness to the apostles make his letters another ideal candidate to examine early interpretations of their doctrine. His mention of the three-level episcopate and developed ecclesiology dates him to later than Didache, however.^[11] His encouragement to various churches as he approached martyrdom contains significant theological insight that indicates a teaching consistent with that of the apostles doctrinally in spite of a somewhat different ecclesiology. Like Paul in Galatians and Romans, he addresses Judaizers and Jewish believers along with other issues, so a proper comparison is possible to some degree.^[12]

Arnold discusses at length how Ignatius wrote that Jews can certainly become Christians, but Christians cannot become Jews without no longer being Christians, quite consistent with Paul’s very specific statement to that effect in Galatians 5:2-5. This leads him to conclude that while scholars are relatively divided on the similarity between Ignatius and Paul, the two are at least consistent on this matter. The key issue to compare, though, is justification, which Arnold describes as how individuals are saved without defining “saved”. He notes that the contrast in both authors is between allegiance to Judaism and salvation by grace. He rightly notes that Ignatius never connects salvation and personal righteousness. However, he makes the unstated assumption that justification and salvation are always being saved from God’s wrath at the last judgment, something that he does not substantiate.^[13]

Torrance argues extensively that Ignatius does not understand the gospel because he requires love in addition to faith. He claims specifically that Ignatius does not use dikaioo in the Pauline sense in the two cases where it is used, that it means becoming just, a process that requires action by man to be perfected and not be reprobate, and that justification is something yet to be attained, particularly by his martyrdom Torrance rejects Ignatius because he is not as clear as Paul and does not use exactly the same language..^[14] Arnold opines that Torrance oversells his case, noting correctly that Paul links faith and love. He agrees that Ignatius links his salvation to his martyrdom, citing Paul’s advocacy of enduring to the end, and he concludes that Ignatius is consistent with Paul. However, he notes that when Ignatius discusses justification, it is linked to the prayers of others, and he gives a lengthy excursus on why Ignatius does not mean what he writes.^[15]

Two passages in particular are relevant to this discussion, the only two times justification is mentioned in these letters. First, in his Letter to Philadelphia 8.2, Ignatius writes:

and I entreat you, Do ye nothing in a spirit of factiousness but after the teaching of Christ. For I heard certain persons saying, If I find it not in the charters, I believe it not in the Gospel. And when I said to them, It is written, they answered me That is the question. But as for me, my charter is Jesus Christ, the inviolable charter is His cross and His death and His resurrection, and faith through Him; wherein I desire to be justified through your prayers.^[16]

If justification is understood as a judicial declaration of pardon, or “not-guilty”, then Arnold and Torrance are quite correct to question what is being said here, either reinterpreting or simply declaring that this is not consistent with that interpretation of justification in Paul. However, none of that is necessary. Ignatius is clearly not discussing initial justification, being freed from bondage to sin, as none of that language is in view. Rather, he is discussing the perfection in Christ that results in participation in the resurrection from the dead that Paul discusses in Philippians 3. Paul discusses the futility of circumcision and following the Law (another theme for Irenaeus), how he leaves that behind and presses forward to work towards resurrection, becoming like Christ in both suffering and death. Schoedel notes that Irenaeus compares his martyrdom to Christ’s both here and throughout the letters and that he is using the comparison as a rhetorical device in an unrelated matter.^[17] Irenaeus thus mentions in passing that he depends on the prayers of the church to help him through the ordeal that perfects his faith, which seems to be exactly what Paul is saying in Philippians 1:19, that the situation and his suffering will work out for his salvation and that Christ will be honored in his body whether in life or death. Salvation and justification seem synonymous here, that God will judge in favor of the oppressed and save. The belief is that God will be glorified through the martyr’s endurance to the end as strengthened by the prayers of the church, saving the martyr from failing in faithfulness due to personal weakness. This is essentially Arnold’s assessment, though he does not make the direct comparison to Philippians and discounts dependence on the prayers of others.^[18] That Ignatius seems less confident than Paul in Philippians may merely be humility rather than theology.

The other use of justification in the letters, which Torrance mentions, is in the Letter to the Romans 5.1:

From Syria even unto Rome I fight with wild beasts, by land and sea, by night and by day, being bound amidst ten leopards, even a company of soldiers, who only wax worse when they are kindly treated. Howbeit through their wrong doings I become more completely a disciple; yet am I not hereby justified.^[19]

This passage certainly seems to be more problematic in terms of being saved by works, but it is not when Paul’s use of justification in 1 Corinthians 4:1-4 is considered. Paul states that servants must be found faithful, and while he does not know of anything against himself, “I am not hereby justified.” Ignatius says that he is becoming more completely a disciple, but he is “not hereby justified.” Both acknowledge that their own opinions of their progress toward perfection is not the basis of justification. Ignatius proceeds in the next verses to pray for courage toward his martyrdom that he might “attain unto Jesus Christ,” (5:2-3). This language is again quite similar to Paul’s desire expressed in Philippians 3:8-11 that he might attain to the resurrection of the dead by being conformed to Christ’s death, something granted through God’s justice on the basis of faith and not something he earned through the Law. As with the previous passage, Ignatius does not use dikaioo to refer to initial coming out of slavery to sin, but the same way Paul uses dikaiosune to refer to God’s action in the lifelong process of conforming the believer to Christ’s image and thus delivering from death, which Paul admits in Philippians 3:12-14 that he has not yet completed at the time of writing.

Thus, in his use of justification language, Ignatius is entirely consistent with scriptural usage in general and Pauline theology in particular. He views God’s justice as deliverance for the oppressed and salvific, not a pardon of criminal guilt for the guilty under a retributive justice system. He intentionally alludes to Pauline passages in Philippians regarding martyrdom, salvation, resurrection, and justice, and he exhibits the same attitude towards these topics that Paul had. An understanding of Ignatius in light of biblical justice shows that he held to a largely biblical perspective.

Odes of Solomon

 Arnold presents the Odes of Solomon as an early Christian hymnal and argues that its “conception of justification is primarily forensic.”^[20] Given the debate over the origins, authorship, dating, and context of the Odes, this might not seem to be the best source to defend a position on justification. However, it is presented here precisely because Arnold presents it as explicitly forensic, so it provides a good example of how a text can be understood very differently depending on the assumptions of the reader. Arnold sets out to prove forensic justification in the traditional Protestant sense, and this section will examine the same passages in light of what has been discussed up to this point. Additionally, with regard to contrast with the Latin Fathers, it should be noted that extant manuscripts of the Odes are in Syriac and Coptic, but it likely was composed in Greek, and a translation into Syriac or Coptic should not have introduced Western thinking.

Arnold begins by describing the overall soteriology of the author of the Odes. His assessment is excellent, so quoting it will serve better than summarizing.

The Odist firmly believes that God is the main actor in the drama of salvation. Humanity, unable to obtain salvation on their own because of their bondage to sin and death, must depend on the grace of God.⁴⁰ The Odist was gripped by this truth and this led him to praise the God who was the right hand of his salvation…the Odist saw humanity’s condition as bleak, if not hopeless. God had to blaze the path to salvation himself because men and women could not come to the waters of salvation on their own apart from divine intervention.^[21]

 Arnold begins with Ode 17, which specifically mentions justification in verse 2, “And I was justified by my Lord.” It goes on to discuss being freed from vanities and not condemned, then states in verse 4 “My chains were cut off by his hands.” The later part of the Ode depicts Christ speaking of his shattering what held him in his resurrection and then loosing his “bondsmen” (v12). Arnold argues that justification has to be a legal term given the context, and this seems readily apparent. He then argues that it must mean “declare righteous” as it does in Paul, assuming that justice is a criminal matter. However, the Ode contains no discussion of criminal guilt, but rather discusses bondage, chains, and bondsmen, which allude to slavery just as much as imprisonment. In fact, the inference may be both. Arnold admits this with an extensive argument that the remainder of the Ode uses the language of redemption, which has absolutely nothing to do with criminal charges, and which is notably present in Paul’s use of justification language in Romans 3. Arnold concludes correctly that this is entirely consistent with Pauline use of justification language, that justification involves believers being united to Christ and freed from bondage to sin (Romans 6). He closes the section by stating that this is a soteriological hymn discussing imprisonment in sin, justification, and union with Christ, and that this is Paul’s theology.^[22] This all of this is entirely consistent with the discussion of Paul’s theology in the last chapter except that he jumps from justification being a legal decision that frees the imprisoned slave to “declared righteous” as if it is a criminal matter. The use of the term outside of the context of keeping or not keeping the Law is instructive, and this is probably why others are of opinions opposite to Arnold, that this is not consistent with Paul.^[23] In fact, the problem is a Western redefinition of Paul, as described earlier.

For Ode 25, Arnold notes how in both cases, justification is connected to freedom from bondage and that this is by grace. He observes that part of God’s action is action against the enemies of the one justified, just as in David’s Psalms, though he does not make the connection that this justification is a ruling in favor of the believer and against the oppressive enemy rather than a criminal pardon. He cites an “alien righteousness” from verse 10, using the modern sense of “moral goodness” rather than “justice” to support imputation, and connects that to justification in verse 12.^[24] However, the context is clear that the speaker here becomes holy by this act of justice, God acting rightly in judgment, which has far more in common with Israel becoming holy unto God through the Exodus than with criminal justice. The next phrase, which notes the speaker’s adversaries now being afraid, is entirely consistent with this understanding and is not consistent with classic forensic justification. Latke notes the parallelism clearly present in the last verses of this Ode and notes a connection to the language of Psalm 132 and Psalm 143.^[25] The statements taken together indeed show especially strong correlation to the later, which has the context of deliverance from enemies in spite of the psalmist’s sin, not imputation or criminal justice.

These two examples sufficiently illustrate the point, so a discussion of the remaining Ode that Arnold cites, 29, will be omitted for brevity. The primary statement of note will be left to stand for itself in light of what has been presented already: “From the mouth of death he drew me, and I humbled my enemies, and He justified me by His grace.”^[26] Based on this and the previously discussed passages, justification in the Odes is deliverance from the enemies of humanity, sin and death. It is the ruling that results in freedom from bondage, whether that is viewed as slavery or prison, and it views this deliverance in a way that is very similar to the Psalms. When justice is understood in the terms used in those Psalms rather than being redefined, a consistency with New Testament theology of justification and Pauline use of the same terminology is apparent.

Other Greek Writers

Many other writers could be cited, of course. Irenaeus discusses justification, but he does not define it well. Boersma notes that most of the Greek fathers are rather muted on the topic of justification, preferring to use other terms, and Irenaeus is a part of this trend. Irenaeus does discuss justification in his fourth book, but it is set in the context of recapitulation, and it is not explained much beyond citing Paul and other biblical authors.^[27] However, in book 3, Irenaeus largely summarizes Paul’s arguments in Romans, though he only mentions justification once. He asserts that God has caused man to become one with God in Christ. This is accomplished by God becoming man and defeating man’s enemy, death, in order to act as mediator and reconcile man to God. He redeemed man under the power of death by destroying sin. Paraphrasing Paul (Romans 5:19), Irenaeus says,

For as by the disobedience of the one man who was originally moulded from virgin soil, the many were made sinners, and forfeited life; so was it necessary that, by the obedience of one man, who was originally born from a virgin, many should be justified and receive salvation…God recapitulated in Himself the ancient formation of man, that he might kill sin, deprive death of its power and vivify man; and therefore his works are true.^[28]

Thus, in one paragraph, Irenaeus equates Paul’s concept of justification and salvation in Romans 3 with his “made righteous” in Romans 5 while equating both with killing sin, depriving death of his power, and redeeming man from that bondage. McGrath notes that Irenaeus has a significantly different emphasis on justification from Paul and that Ignatius defines Paul’s “works of the Law” narrowly as the Mosaic Law.^[29] This interpretation is consistent with what has been summarized to this point, and the difference in emphasis can be attributed to Paul addressing a mixed Jew/Gentile church or refuting Judaizers while Irenaeus was addressing Gnostics and Marcionites. Paul’s emphasis was different in his other letters due to their different context, too.

            A discussion of Greek Fathers would not be complete without mentioning Origen. However, Origen is not particularly useful in this discussion, as most of his writings are extant only in Latin. Debate has raged as to whether Rufinus can be considered a reliable translator. The reliability of the Greek manuscripts was questioned even in his time, prompting significant emendation, and few of even these questionable manuscripts are extant. Hill, in an examination of affliction in Origen, concludes that Rufinus has “important soteriological difference” from Origen, especially regarding grace and justification.^[30] Given these differences and the lack of reliable or complete Greek manuscripts, Origen should not be used as a normative source for Greek thought on justification and how it differs from Latin thought. If anything, Origen is an example of how corruption in translation occurs. McGrath notes that Origen makes effort to contextualize justification into his Greco-Roman environment, and thus even if preserved perfectly, his teaching would be this cultural transposition of justice and justification rather than his understanding of Paul’s original thought.^[31] In spite of such issues, however, Scheck notes that Origen does not stress the punitive aspect of God’s justice but focuses on distributive justice. The justice of God is the work of Christ, his redemptive work in reconciling humanity to God.^[32] If Scheck is correct, then Origen is indeed consistent with the other Greek writers.

            McGrath cites Chrysostom as a fourth century example of Greek thought on justification, noting that he clearly sees this as an act of God that is transformative for the believer, consistent with the idea of deification as a central soteriological theme. He first cites Chrysostom’s comments on Romans 1:17 that God’s righteousness is a gift, and then he quotes comments on Romans 3:24 that God makes humans righteous by declaring his righteousness.^[33] Barber notes that this is a revision of McGrath’s previous editions and that this understanding is contrary to the Reformation concept of imputed righteousness.^[34] What is overlooked by both, however, is that in theological Greek, righteousness is not abstract moral goodness. It is doing right, and it is especially linked to acting in justice as a judge. God’s justice in delivering humanity from sin and death is indeed a gift and is undeserved, and that is why in his homily on Romans 1:17, Chrysostom goes on to explain why he speaks of such doctrines, “for even from the corruption in our present life we have escaped by no other means than through the faith.”^[35]  Further, in his discussion of Romans 3:24, Chrysostom states that the choice of word for “redemption” is to indicate that “we should come no more into such slavery.”^[36] Chrysostom indicates that a person becoming righteous through God’s declaration is transformative because that declaration brings the person out of slavery to sin and thus enables the person to be just. While his emphasis is different, Chrysostom is entirely consistent with biblical restorative justice. Paul’s term dikaiosis has not been assimilated to a transformational framework, as McGrath claims, but has been appropriately and consistently understood.

Conclusion

Other writers could be cited, but the pattern is clear. Justice and justification, communicated by the dik- word group, have a relatively consistent meaning and usage through the Septuagint, the New Testament, and the Greek Fathers. Certainly, emphasis shifted over time, and exceptions can be found. As the divide between Christians and Jews grew, distance from Jewish roots also grew, and more retributive language can be seen. Additionally, as deification became a more important concept in the Greek church, as it is to this day, the person being made righteous began to be emphasized more than the freedom from slavery to sin that made the person capable of such justice that shows forth the image of God and makes one like God. The shift in emphasis from deliverance from slavery to sin to becoming righteous like God is akin to shift in emphasis from the Exodus to crossing Jordan. Those who trust God are saved from something and to something, and these are two sides of a coin, not a contradiction. However, when Latin theologians began to arise, the emphasis shifted in an entirely different direction.

Latin Fathers

The Latin Fathers use their own vocabulary and have their own focus with respect to justice that is quite different from the Greek writings discussed to this point. Again, space constrains the extent of the discussion, so only two authors will be discussed in this survey. The discussion begins with Tertullian, broadly considered the first of the Latin Fathers and the originator of the Latin vocabulary of Christianity. While others also make significant contributions, Augustine clearly is the true giant of the early Latin Christian West. Augustine’s writings have had such obvious influence on Western theology that such a statement hardly requires defense. Augustine used Tertullian’s vocabulary to articulate doctrinal positions that move in a decidedly different direction from the Greek Fathers, a change in direction that can be seen in Western Christianity to this day.

Tertullian

Tertullian can be considered the first theologian of the West, as he is the first major author whose Latin writings are extant. This makes him responsible for the Latin vocabulary of Christianity.^[37] Tertullian considered himself a defender of the gospel, not an innovator, but his rhetorical force sometimes combined philosophy, rhetoric, and doctrine in unique and brilliant ways. Osborn notes that he “framed a vocabulary” and “liberated Christian thought from its Greek beginnings.”^[38] Dunn opines that much of Tertullian’s Latin religious vocabulary was taken from Jewish sources, including Latin versions of the Jewish scriptures.^[39]

One of the unique characteristics of his language is the extensive use of legal language, which likely led to the assumption that he was a lawyer (in addition to his sharing a name with a known lawyer), though Barnes opines that this is unlikely and that ancient writers on Tertullian had faulty information.^[40] Dolganov indicates that legal language was very familiar to North Africans and used by many orators, including Tertullian.^[41] In fact, she asserts that Tertullian was likely a rhetorician who made intentional use of Latin to engage imperial power and that no other writer was as intense in the use of legal language, including the image of imperial criminal court.^[42] Clearly, that language necessarily paints a somewhat different picture than the one implied by the Semitic concept of justice. Some examples from Tertullian’s writing will illustrate the distinct change in tone and vocabulary.

In his treatise on the Lord’s Prayer, Tertullian comments on the forgiveness of debts:

A petition for pardon is a full confession; because he who begs for pardon fully admits his guilt. Thus, too, penitence is demonstrated acceptable to God who desires it rather than the death of the sinner. Moreover, debt is, in the Scriptures, a figure of guilt; because it is equally due to the sentence of judgment, and is exacted by it: nor does it evade the justice of exaction, unless the exaction be remitted, just as the lord remitted to that slave in the parable his debt; for hither does the scope of the whole parable tend. For the fact withal, that the same servant, after liberated by his lord, does not equally spare his own debtor; and, being on that account impeached before his lord, is made over to the tormentor to pay the uttermost farthing—that is, every guilt, however small: corresponds with our profession that “we also remit to our debtors;” indeed elsewhere, too, in conformity with this Form of Prayer, He saith, “Remit, and it shall be remitted you.”^[43]

He makes here an explicit equivalence of debt to criminal guilt. Tertullian was fluent in Greek, and he explained because he knew that he was translating the concept into his own culture. If guilt were a concept clearly articulated in the Greek scriptures and it was clearly equated to debt, no such explanation would be necessary. He also equates the judgment to what the guilty is due and what therefore must be exacted by justice, though he does allow for remission. While not contradictory to the Semitic concept of justice previously discussed, this certainly places a greater focus on merited penalty than on restoration as the goal of justice.

            In his treatise “On Repentance”, Tertullian describes the pardon that remits that merited penalty as equivalent to redemption, and he cites repentance as the price a believer pays to receive the pardon. He writes,

Further, how inconsistent is it to expect pardon of sins (to be granted) to a repentance which they have not fulfilled! This is to hold out your hand for merchandise, but not produce the price. For repentance is the price at which the Lord has determined to award pardon: He proposes the redemption of release from penalty at this compensating exchange of repentance. If, then, sellers first examine the coin with which they make their bargains, to see whether it be cut, or scraped, or adulterated,⁷ we believe likewise that the Lord, when about to make us the grant of so costly merchandise, even of eternal life, first institutes a probation of our repentance.^[44]

Redemption is mostly disassociated from slavery here (though slavery is briefly mentioned alongside the obligations of a soldier further down) in defiance of what the term means biblically. Instead of the image of a kinsman redeemer, Tertullian paints the picture of a merciful judge that wants to make sure the accused is contrite enough to merit the pardon. Criticizing his doctrine is not the focus here; the issue is that his adaptation of Roman legal vocabulary to support his argument becomes a de facto change in the meaning of justice before God.

            To be fair, Tertullian does not misunderstand the scriptures. He makes his understanding of biblical justice quite clear in his discussion of the Sermon on the Mount in Against Marcion Book IV. He explains from the Psalms, the Prophets, and even Kings how God’s justice is to relieve the suffering of the poor, arguing that Jesus continues this understanding in the New Testament to say that there is one God of both Testaments. However, he wraps up that chapter by using the Roman euphemism for crucifixion, “suffer the penalty,” for the treatment Christ submitted himself to.^[45] While technically accurate, this brings the Roman idea of the cross as punishment into the discussion, an idea that develops into penal substitutionary atonement centuries later.

            Tertullian seems to have understood the scriptures quite well, but as a rhetorician, he used language familiar to his audience to convey the gospel in terms they would understand, Roman legal terms. As noted earlier, this may have also been an intentional affront to Roman power. He cannot be expected to have understood that these terms would become the default vocabulary for Western Christianity, and he almost certainly did not intend to create changes of meaning. However, as his vocabulary came into wide use by Latin writers and thinkers, the ideas being considered subtly to correspond to the new vocabulary, particularly in writers not fluent in Greek or Hebrew like Augustine.

 Augustine

Almost no Latin writer has been as influential or widely read as Augustine, and certainly none before Aquinas. His thinking is influential in almost all areas of theology, particularly in regard to soteriology. McGrath titles his chapter on Augustine “The Fountainhead” for good reason, as he notes that while other Latin authors such as Ambrosiaster and Hilary of Poitiers wrote on justification, Augustine was the first to establish a body of systematic thought on the topic, an integration of his ideas on justification with broader concepts of soteriology.^[46] This integration was required because the Latin terms used conveyed meanings somewhat different than those of the earlier Greek terms. Because Augustine knew no Hebrew and little Greek, he had to rely only on the Latin texts, and he had to make sense of the Latin terms, which McGrath notes “caused him difficulty at certain points.”^[47] The discontinuity of thought between the scriptures and earlier Greek writers on the one hand and Augustine as the fountainhead of Western thought on the other is directly attributable to this language “difficulty”. While a thorough explication of Augustine’s immense body of work on this topic is well beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief summary should suffice to support the essence of the claim being made here.

McGrath focuses on justification, but some background is required to understand the choices Augustine made. With a Latin vocabulary tuned to Roman justice, Augustine adopted a variation of a Latin definition. In his own words, the task of justice “is to see that to each is given what belongs to each.”^[48] Augustine applies this idea in a variety of ways. In the immediate context of that statement, it refers to humans giving God his due, and thus being rightly ordered before God. In his concept of God’s justice toward humans, this means restoring them to a state in which they give God his due. McGrath summarizes this way:

For Augustine, there is an essentially linear connection between ius and iustitia, which is in turn correlated with the underlying notion of ordo, manifested in both the orders of creation and redemption. Iustitia is essentially the ordering of the world according to the order of being, itself an expression of the divine will. God created humans as they ought to be; by choosing to ignore this ordering, humans stepped outside this state of iustitia, so that their present state of iniustitia requires rectification through divine transformation, in that this is not something that sinful humanity is able to achieve unaided. Justification is therefore essentially a ‘making right’, a restoration of every facet of the relationship between God and humanity.^[49]

This concept of justice seems quite consistent with what can be found in the scriptures and in the Greek Fathers, in that it focuses on restoring the relationship between God and humans. However, the important distinction is that the judicial element is all but absent from this formulation. For Augustine, though justice has clear legal and moral elements, it is not primarily a legal or moral concept.^[50] Since much of the New Testament imagery involves the use of legal structures to achieve this end, clearly Augustine’s concept of justice has a discontinuity with that of these earlier writings.

Augustine does have a legal concept of justice, though, one that involves punishment of sin. He notes that such justice will occur at the final judgment, where “The difference between the rewards and punishments which are due to the just and the wicked is a difference which is not perceived in the light of our visible sun amid the shadows of this life, but it will become luminously clear in the light of the Sun of Righteousness and in the brightness of eternal life—for that will be a judgment the like of which has never been.”^[51] He further holds that this justice of punishment, this demand of retribution, is in contrast to God’s mercy on those who are pardoned in God’s unmerited gift. All merit the punishment of both death and eternal evil, but God’s mercy allows freedom from this punishment by grace.^[52]

If justice is giving people what they are due, and if God is just, then somehow this mercy and pardon must be reconciled with justice. This is where Augustine’s doctrine of justification enters this picture. McGrath notes that Augustine derives his understanding of iustificare primarily from his understanding of the Latin roots, and the term is almost entirely a post-classical theological term without use in secular writing. Augustine sees justification as making a person righteous or just. ^[53] He comments on Psalm 7, “For to justify the ungodly means to make him pass from impiety to holiness, and transform the property of the devil into the temple of God.”^[54] Thus, Augustine’s concept of justification is in line with the proper ordering of humanity that he describes as the task of God’s justice. In fact, this act of justification is the act of God gifting his righteousness to the ungodly. That righteousness bestowed upon humans is inherent, not imputed; it is the act of reordering humanity to be what it should be.^[55] This is justice because it is rendering to humanity what it is due; in fact, Augustine states that humans merit grace because they are made in the image of God, though it is grace because there is no merit from human action involved^[56] This is why he can say that God’s justice is a crowning of his own gifts when he rewards human merit.^[57] For, since even the endowment of the image of God is a gift, no human effort results in this merit; it is all by grace.

Summarizing, then, the mechanism of salvation inherent in Augustine’s understanding of justification is that God justifies by rightly ordering humans in a way that is fitting for those made in his image. This justification results in human merit, which God then rewards as he judges based on merit at the final judgment. Those who have not been thus reordered have demerit which is justly and appropriately compensated. Both of these are necessary because, “If both were saved, then what is justly due to sin would not be apparent; if no one were saved, we would not know the free gift of grace.”^[58]

While Augustine’s concept of restoring right order seems consistent with earlier authors, including biblical authors, a careful study of the mechanism he describes shows that his ideas represent a marked departure from both Greek and Hebrew theological writing. He discusses the bondage of the will, certainly, and he mentions redemption from time to time, but he does not seem to link these to a legal action of justification in the same way that Paul did. Somehow, the legal aspect is something almost entirely absorbed and treated as irrelevant. Justification and judgment are not even in the same sphere in Augustinian thought, for the most part, and merit becomes a primary focus. McGrath claims that this results from Augustine’s understanding of the Latin terminology used absent any significant contextual understanding of the Greek and Hebrew terms it translated, and this seems to be the case.^[59]

Conclusion

The differences between Augustinian thought and Greek thought are subtle when viewed through a Western lens, but the shift is more significant than is first apparent. The Septuagint, the New Testament, and the Greek Fathers use the dik- word group to translate Hebrew concepts of justice that are markedly different from the conceptions of the Western world. This included new usages of Greek words that were unique to theological writing. However, these new usages are relatively consistent in their description of doing right, restoring right order, and delivering the oppressed to restore right order, including doing so by judicial or military force as necessary. Merit is largely absent from these ideas, with the restoration of order as the priority. In fact, in the primary metaphor for the Christian life, the Exodus, merit is explicitly excluded both from deliverance from slavery and from entry to the promised land, though God refers to both in judicial terms. When these ideas are translated into the Latin ius group of words, the focus quickly becomes rendering to each his due based on merit and the tension between the fitting deliverance of those in the image of God and punishing the sinner. The Latin deliverance idea almost completely deemphasizes the legal aspects of redemption from slavery in favor of an enabling of the human soul to merit good rather than punishment. The underlying concepts of justice could not be more different, yet this somehow was seen as consistent development.

Further discussion of the evolution of Western ideas is beyond the scope of the current work. McGraths’ excellent treatment of the development of the Western idea of justification as Augustine’s very Latin ideas were debated continues the historical aspect of this matter. The focus here is that Augustine is indeed “The Fountainhead” of the Western debate, as McGrath claims. The ways that Augustine frames justice, justification, and righteousness are unique beyond just his systematic and prolific treatment of the topic. His ideas represent a starting point of an entirely new concept that stands in contrast to the biblical and early Christian tradition of justification as deliverance from oppression by the devil and debt slavery to sin. This new starting point represents a discontinuity in Christian tradition between Hebrew and Greek thought on the one hand and Western thought and doctrine on the other.

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[1] Kurt Niederwimmer and Harold W. Attridge, The Didache: A Commentary, Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 52-53.

^[2] Thomas F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1996), 40–41.

^[3] Shawn J. Wilhite, The Didache: A Commentary, ed. Paul A. Hartog and Shawn J. Wilhite, vol. 1, Apostolic Fathers Commentary Series (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2019), 71.

^[4] Thomas O’Loughlin, The Didache: A Window on the Earliest Christians (London; Grand Rapids, MI: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; Baker Academic, 2010), 23.

[5] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 20-21.

[6] Ibid., 25-29.

[7] Thomas F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1996), 48-49.

[8] Thomas F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1996), 49.

[9] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 32-33.

^[10] Eusebius of Caesarea, An Ecclesiastical History to the 20th Year of the Reign of Constantine, trans. S.E. Parker (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1847), 138.

^[11] William R. Schoedel, Saint Ignatius Bishop of Antioch, and Helmut Koester, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch, Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), x–xi.

[12] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 45.

[13] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 53-67.

[14] Thomas F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1996), 67.

[15] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 53-67.

^[16] Joseph Barber Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer, The Apostolic Fathers (London: Macmillan and Co., 1891), 155.

[17] William R. Schoedel, Saint Ignatius Bishop of Antioch, and Helmut Koester, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch, Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 209.

[18] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 60-65.

^[19] Joseph Barber Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer, The Apostolic Fathers (London: Macmillan and Co., 1891), 151.

[20] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 104-105.

[21] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 113-114.

[22] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 115-128.

[23] Michael Lattke and Harold W. Attridge, Odes of Solomon: A Commentary, Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 235.

[24] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 128-142.

[25] Michael Lattke and Harold W. Attridge, Odes of Solomon: A Commentary, Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 364.

[26] Brian Arnold, Justification in the Second Century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 142.

[27] Hans Boersma, “Justification within Recapitulation: Irenaeus in Ecumenical Dialogue,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 22, issue 2 (April 2020): 169-190,  https://doi-org.ezproxy.regent.edu/10.1111/ijst.12391.

^[28] Irenaeus of Lyons, The Writings of Irenæus, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, trans. Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut, vol. 1, Ante-Nicene Christian Library (Edinburgh; London; Dublin: T. & T. Clark; Hamilton & Co.; John Robertson & Co., 1868–1869), 343–344.

[29] Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 32-33.

[30] Kevin D. Hill, “Rufinus as an Interpreter of Origen: Ascetic Affliction in the ‘Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos,”” Augustiniana 60, no. 1/2 (2010): 145–68. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44993038.

[31] Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 35.

[32] Thomas P. Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 32-33.

[33] Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020., 36-37.

[34] Michael P. Barber, “Justification in the Greek Fathers: An Important Reversal in the New Edition of Iusitia Dei (Alister McGrath),” The Sacred Page,  May 5, 2020, https://thesacredpage.com/2020/05/05/justification-in-the-greek-fathers-an-important-reversal-in-the-new-edition-of-iustitia-dei-allister-mcgrath/.

^[35] John Chrysostom, “Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople, on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans,” in Saint Chrysostom: Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. J. B. Morris, W. H. Simcox, and George B. Stevens, vol. 11, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, First Series (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1889), 350.

[36] Ibid., 377.

[37] Geoffrey D. Dunn, Tertullian (London: Routledge, 2004), 7.

[38] Eric Osborne, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xiii-xiv.

[39] Geoffrey D. Dunn, Tertullian (London: Routledge, 2004), 9.

[40]  Timothy D. Barnes, Tertullian, A Historical and Literary Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1071), 57-59.

[41] Anna Dolganov, “Nutricula causidicorum: Legal Practitioners in Roman North Africa,” in Law in the Roman Provinces, ed. Kimberly Czajkowski and Benedikt Eckhardt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 378.

[42] Anna Dolganov, “Tertullian the “Jurist” and the Language of Roman Law,” (abstract, paper presented at the 147th annual meeting of the Society for Classical Studies, San Francisco, CA, January 8, 2016), https://classicalstudies.org/annual-meeting/147/abstract/tertullian-jurist-and-language-roman-law.

^[43] Tertullian, “On Prayer,” in Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. S. Thelwall, vol. 3, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 684.

^[44] Tertullian, “On Repentance,” in Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. S. Thelwall, vol. 3, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 661.

^[45] Tertullian, “The Five Books against Marcion,” in Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. Peter Holmes, vol. 3, The Ante-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1885), 367.

[46] A.E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 42-43.

[47] Ibid, 46. Timothy Law, When God Spoke Greek (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 162.

[48] Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, Books XVII–XXII, ed. Hermigild Dressler, trans. Gerald G. Walsh and Daniel J. Honan, vol. 24, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1954), 198.

[49] A.E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 50.

[50] A.E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 50.

^[51] Augustine of Hippo, The City of God, Books XVII–XXII, ed. Hermigild Dressler, trans. Gerald G. Walsh and Daniel J. Honan, vol. 24, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1954), 327.

^[52] Ibid., 371.

[53] A.E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 46.

^[54] St. Augustine, St. Augustine: On the Psalms, Psalms 1–29, ed. Johannes Quasten and Walter J. Burghardt, trans. Scholastica Hebgin and Felicitas Corrigan, 29th ed., vol. I, Ancient Christian Writers (New York; Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1960), 80.

[55] A.E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 49-50.

^[56] Augustine of Hippo, Against Julian, ed. Hermigild Dressler, trans. Matthew A. Schumacher, vol. 35, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1957), 178.

^[57] Augustine of Hippo, Letters (165–203), ed. Hermigild Dressler, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 30, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 313.

^[58] Augustine of Hippo, Letters (165–203), ed. Hermigild Dressler, trans. Wilfrid Parsons, vol. 30, The Fathers of the Church (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1955), 303–304.

[59] A.E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei, 4^th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 46.